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Abstract 
The Greek turmoil commenced as a balance of payments, or “sudden stop”, 
crisis induced by large current account and primary government deficits. It 
became an economic and social disturbance of historic proportions. Its 
proximate cause was loss of competitiveness within the Eurozone due primarily 
to domestic German wage policies. The bail-out policies, imposed by the 
lenders primarily for reasons of Eurozone stability and adopted by Greece, have 
had disastrous effects on both economy and society. The “historical bloc” that 
dominates Greek society willingly submitted to this strategy, losing sovereignty, 
for reasons including fear and identity.  
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1.Introduction 
 
The Greek turmoil began in 2010 in the form of a balance of payments, or 
“sudden stop”, crisis, similar to those of developing countries in the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s, but became a protracted and deeply destructive disturbance 
of both economy and society. Moreover, since the end of the sharp phase of 
the crisis in 2013 the country has been unable to resume sustained growth. 
Analysis of these complex phenomena requires a political economy approach 
that places economic processes in their appropriate social and political context.  
 
The point of departure for the required analytical approach is that Greece has 
failed to compete successfully with other member states of the Eurozone, and 
has assumed a peripheral place within the monetary union. Section 2 of the 
paper shows that the most prominent cause of weak Greek competitiveness – 
and hence much of the virulence of the crisis – lies with domestic German wage 
suppression. Loss of competitiveness has compounded the long-term structural 
problems of the Greek economy which have become worse since entering the 
EU in 1981. This is the fundamental reason why Greece has confronted a 
turmoil of exceptional severity and protracted nature in the 2010s.    
 
The true analytical conundrum, however, is posed by the conduct of the lenders 
to Greece and even more of the Greek policy makers. Summarily put, the 
lenders have forced Greece to adopt bail-out policies which have consistently 
failed to produce expected results. Greek policy makers, on the other hand, 
have acceded to the policies of the lenders despite the damage inflicted on both 
economy and society. They have also desisted from proposing, or even 
advocating, the two policies that could have put the country on a different path, 
namely debt write off and exit from the Eurozone. As a result, the country has 
been subjected to unprecedented economic and social dislocation since early 
2010, without an obvious end in sight. 
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To deal with this conundrum it is necessary to go beyond strictly economic 
factors. It is argued in section 4 that the stance of Greece reflects a dramatic 
loss of sovereignty imposed by foreign lenders within the confines of the 
Eurozone. Acceptance of the loss of sovereignty in turn reflects fear and 
concerns about identity in case of exiting the monetary union. These elements 
are most prominent within the Gramscian “historical bloc” that holds power in 
the country, but have also spread across society. By submitting to the lenders 
and accepting loss of sovereignty, the Greek “historical bloc” has also 
weakened the country’s long-term growth prospects, as is briefly argued in 
section 5. The Greek crisis thus casts a harsh light on the nature of the 
Eurozone and its implications for other peripheral countries of the monetary 
union.  
 
2. Facing a balance of payments crisis within the Eurozone 
 
2.1 A Greek “sudden stop”  
 
It is increasingly accepted in the mainstream economic literature that the 
Eurozone crisis of 2010-12 – and thus also the Greek crisis – was 
fundamentally a balance of payments crisis, of the “sudden stop” variety, 
involving a sudden reversal of capital flows from abroad, as has happened 
frequently in developing countries in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. 1 This is 
without denying the deficiencies of the so-called “architecture” of the monetary 
union, for instance, the absence of a fiscal and banking union to supplement 
the monetary union. 2 Deficiencies in the “architecture” of the EMU are unable 
by themselves to account for the outbreak of a crisis: a specific mechanism is 
necessary, and that is what the “sudden stop” analysis offers.   
 
Balance of payments crises come in a variety of forms, but tend to break out as 
private capital flows to private or sovereign borrowers suddenly dry up in 
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international markets. Inability to borrow by private or sovereign borrowers sets 
off a train of events: fall of the exchange rate; shrinkage of domestic credit; 
inability to make payments to exporters from abroad and to domestic suppliers; 
and eventually a recession with falling output and rising unemployment.  
  
Since “sudden stop” crises break out in the international financial markets, their 
immediate causes tend to be associated with the current and the capital 
account. In the post-Bretton-Woods world of floating exchange rates and free 
capital flows, a current account deficit can generally be made good through a 
capital account surplus. Developing countries typically try to peg their exchange 
rates, often by “shadowing” a major currency, with the aim of stabilising trading 
conditions. For the peg to be maintained, a current account deficit would have 
to be balanced reasonably quickly by a surplus on capital account. A threat to 
the ability to borrow abroad would soon place a deficit country at risk of 
exchange rate collapse. 
 
From the perspective of international lenders, a growing current account deficit 
in a developing country is an indicator of increasing reliance on external 
borrowing. In this connection both domestic fiscal policy and the public debt 
acquire exceptional importance. For, sustained fiscal deficits absorb domestic 
loanable capital, encouraging both private and public borrowers to seek funds 
abroad. If a country has recorded large fiscal deficits and its public debt has 
risen substantially, international lenders would face an increased risk of default, 
other things equal. A sustained current account deficit would thus acquire 
exceptional poignancy for policy makers.  
 
The realisation that the Greek crisis was initially a balance of payments crisis 
came neither easily, nor naturally, to the policy-making apparatus of the 
European Union. The official response in early 2010 was that the Eurozone 
turmoil had been caused by Greek “dishonesty”, “incompetence” and the like. 
Lack of understanding made for not a little vindictiveness toward Greece, and 
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even led to the imposition of absurdly punitive interest rates on the initial loans, 
presumably to deal with “moral hazard”. 3 Only a few voices at the time pointed 
to the underlying nature of the Eurozone crisis, and these typically came from 
outside the economics mainstream. 4  
 
There are no mysteries about the fundamental components of the Greek 
balance of payments crisis in 2010. The current account exhibited an enormous 
deficit by 2008, apparent in Figure 1; the fiscal primary balance recorded huge 
deficits by the late 2000s, shown in Figure 2, although it had appeared to 
stabilise in the mid-2000s perhaps partly due to “creative” use of statistics by 
the Greek authorities; and the ratio of public debt to GDP reached very high 
levels in the late 2000s, as is shown in Figure 3. Indeed, it is remarkable that 
Greece had avoided the outburst of a crisis in its external transactions in 2009. 
 
<FIGURE 1 HERE> 
 
<FIGURE 2 HERE> 
 
<FIGURE 2 HERE> 
 
There are, however, two issues that have not been adequately addressed in 
the economic literature on this issue, both mainstream and heterodox. The first 
concerns the underlying causes of the enormous Greek current account deficit 
that has catalysed the “sudden stop”; the second refers to the composition of 
the aggregate Greek debt - private and public, internal and external – which 
has dictated the path of subsequent events. It is not accidental that both issues 
are directly related to Greek participation in the Eurozone. For, the Greek 
balance of payments crisis was ultimately an outcome of the country’s 
membership of the monetary union. 
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2.2 Loss of competitiveness and the Greek crisis 
 
There are two fundamental approaches to explaining the huge external deficit 
of Greece in the late 2000s.  
 
The first approach to the deficit stresses the loss of competitiveness by Greece 
and other countries in the periphery in the preceding years, but contains two 
very different currents within it. There is a dominant current, which is 
characteristic of the European Commission, and attributes the loss of 
competitiveness primarily to domestic causes, namely the frictions, institutional 
weaknesses, and inefficiencies of Greek economy and society. 5 By this token 
a policy of structural reform in Greece, typically of a neoliberal character, would 
be necessary to restore competitiveness.  
 
There is, however, a further current which attributes the loss of competitiveness 
by Greece (and much of the periphery of the Eurozone) essentially to German 
wage policies. It was originally put forth by broadly heterodox economists, and 
provides the analytical basis for this paper. 6 The contrast with the dominant 
current is clear, since the latter downplays, or even completely ignores, the 
import of German wages and prices for the trajectory of competitiveness within 
the EMU. 7 
 
The second approach to the deficit focuses on the flows of bank lending from 
core to peripheral EMU countries in the 2000s. Presumably these flows 
encouraged rapid growth of credit in the periphery, thus boosting consumption 
and real estate speculation, and leading to current account deficits. This 
approach lays much of the blame for the crisis on banks operating from the core 
to the periphery, and thus ostensibly opposes the policies of the European 
Commission. It is shown in section 2.3, however, that this approach is 
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unsatisfactory, both theoretically and empirically, particularly for Greece. That 
is not to deny the problematic role of banks in the Eurozone crisis, which is also 
broadly appreciated by mainstream economists. 8  
 
To be more specific, at the root of the Eurozone – and the Greek – crisis lie 
divergences in competitiveness driven fundamentally by domestic German 
wage policies, that is by the trajectory of capital-labour relations in Germany. 
International competitiveness is usually measured by nominal unit labour cost, 
C, defined as the nominal remuneration of labour, W, divided by real output, 
Y/P. Ιf the total number of hours worked, L, was taken into account, C could be 
further written as the nominal remuneration of labour per hour worked, W/L, 
divided by the productivity of labour, Y/PL. Thus:  
 
C = W/(Y/P) = (W/L)/(Y/PL) 
 
It is apparent that, other things equal, a rise in the nominal remuneration of 
labour would raise C, thus lowering competitiveness, while a rise in the 
productivity of labour would reduce C, thus raising competitiveness. Finally, it 
C tends to be closely correlated with inflation. 
 
On this basis, the decline in Greek national competitiveness in the 2000s is not 
hard to establish: nominal unit labour costs rose fast, and indeed much faster 
than Germany, as is shown in Figure 4 for a group of core and peripheral 
Eurozone countries.  
 
<FIGURE 4 HERE> 
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This was certainly not due to weak growth in Greek labour productivity, which 
actually rose quite rapidly within the Eurozone, and indeed faster than German 
labour productivity, as is shown in Figure 5.  
 
<FIGURE 5 HERE> 
 
There is no doubt that Greek competitiveness within the Eurozone declined 
essentially because the nominal remuneration of Greek labour rose faster than 
that of German labour, the latter remaining essentially frozen throughout the 
2000s.  
 
The real outlier in the Eurozone in this respect was not Greece but Germany, 
which has applied extraordinary wage restraint on its own workers since the 
end of the 1990s. The resulting divergences in unit labour costs (and correlated 
inflation) could not be offset through the adjustment of exchange rates since 
the EMU has eliminated that option. Put differently, the EMU has become a trap 
for its members, since in the 2000s unit labour costs diverged systematically 
among a group of countries that have historically had dense trade relations, 
which were typically adjusted through exchange rate realignments. In the 
absence of adjustment, however, the loss of competitiveness by one has 
tended to be reflected in the gain of competitiveness by another.    
 
Essentially the same point could also be made in terms of the “real exchange 
rare” of Greece, which has recorded a substantial real appreciation from the 
late 1990s to the late 2000s. 9 The main factors making for appreciation in the 
2000s were, first, the higher rate of inflation compared to Germany and, second, 
the nominal appreciation of the euro compared to the dollar. Considering that 
the Greek current account deficit was mostly with its trade partners within the 
EMU, the rise of the euro relative to the dollar was not particularly significant. 
The paramount factor was, rather, higher Greek inflation relative to Germany. 
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This development is correlated to diverging nominal unit labour costs in the two 
countries. 
 
The secret of German competitive success in the Eurozone has been the 
essential freezing of nominal wages in the 2000s. Wage freeze was a direct 
outcome of altered relations among capital and labour (mediated by the state). 
In the late 1990s the post-war practice of sharing productivity gains via the 
intervention of the German state was abandoned in favour of capital. The 
ostensible logic was that labour costs had to be restrained to protect 
employment. 10 The justification was provided by the approaching monetary 
union, the difficulty of absorbing the German Democratic Republic, nd the 
persistence of unemployment. The changes were actually introduced by the 
Social Democratic government of the late 1990s and early 2000s with the full 
connivance of the labour unions. Although there was no grand German plan to 
dominate the EMU, the outcome was an accretion of competitiveness that has 
transformed Germany into a gigantic exporter within the EU and more 
generally.  
 
Germany has emerged as the most powerful country in the EU through a 
peculiar “neo-mercantilism” that has restrained nominal wages, and thus 
domestic demand, with the aim of boosting exports. The point is of critical 
importance to the Eurozone crisis, though it remains poorly appreciated in 
policy making in Europe. It is important in this connection to stress the following:   
First, the argument refers to national rather than enterprise 
competitiveness. National competitiveness relates fundamentally to the 
operations of the world market, and is ultimately a matter of relative 
prices in the aggregate. 11 Enterprise competitiveness is a 
microeconomic concept that also reflects the quality of management, the 
intensity of labour, and so on. 
Second, it is misleading to estimate the proportions of Greek trade with 
Germany with the aim of demonstrating that the losses of one were (or 
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were not) directly the gains of the other. 12 Greece lost competitiveness 
relative to Germany and to the rest of the Eurozone; in contrast, 
Germany gained competitiveness relative to both Greece and the 
Eurozone. Since both countries trade widely with other Eurozone 
countries, the divergence in competitiveness has made for a current 
account deficit for Greece, and a surplus in Germany, both in the 
aggregate. Furthermore, loss or gain of competitiveness did not translate 
simply into, respectively, decline or rise of exports: it was also reflected 
in the fall or increase in imports, respectively.  
Third, the argument pivots on changes in and not levels of 
competitiveness. It is trivially true that Germany is more competitive than 
Greece. However, there is no need for countries to have similar levels of 
competitiveness to be able to have balanced trade with each other, or 
even to be members of the same monetary union. The real issue is the 
evolution of competitiveness over time.   
Fourth, in sharp contrast to the approach of the European Commission, 
the causes of the divergence of competitiveness did not lie primarily in 
the domestic economy of Greece, or indeed other peripheral countries. 
It is no great discovery that Greek capitalism has been marked by a 
variety of deeply problematic practices, some of which are considered 
below. The point is that competitiveness is inherently a relative concept 
and, in the context of the Eurozone, this implies focusing on the domestic 
policies of Germany, the dominant country.  
Fifth, the analytical stress on competitiveness aims at identifying the 
underlying economic tendencies and has nothing to do with “blaming 
workers” or similarly fanciful notions. If a country lost competitiveness in 
the world market, there would inevitably be implications for its economy 
that must assessed rationally. Moral concern can wait.  
 
To recap, there is no doubt that Geek competitiveness within the Eurozone 
declined heavily in the 2000s, contributing to a vast current account deficit, 
which eventually ushered in a balance of payments crisis. The fundamental 
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reason for the loss of competitiveness, however, was a German wage freeze 
during the same period, which also propelled Germany to the dominant position 
within the Eurozone.  
 
This argument remains fully aware of the structural weakness of the Greek 
economy as well as of the strong growth in domestic demand and credit that 
occurred in Greece prior to the crisis. The Greek economy recorded rapid rates 
of growth in the 2000s, often exceeding 4%, faster than Spain and Portugal. 13 
Investment rose in the late 1990s and continued to rise in the 2000s, though it 
never reached the levels of Spain and Ireland. 14 Moreover, Greece has never 
had a real estate “«bubble»” marked by a rise in residential investment similar 
to Spain and Ireland. Furthermore, the levels of Greek corporate investment in 
GDP have remained systematically lower than other peripheral countries 
throughout the period. 15 The relative weakness of Greek investment has also 
been reflected in the strength of consumption, which rose systematically in the 
2000s, though always in line with GDP growth. The striking aspect of Greek 
consumption was not its growth but its high proportion relative to GDP: it stood 
above 70%, almost 10% higher than Portugal and even more compared to 
Spain, Italy and Germany. 16  
 
Investment and consumption weakness aside, the Greek economy has been 
marked by a profound shift in its structure since the early 1980s in favour of 
services and at the expense of the secondary sector. Production of 
internationally tradable goods has suffered accordingly, and the Greek 
economy has turned toward non-tradable activities, thus becoming relatively 
inward looking. 17 This prominent shift in the structure of the Greek economy 
was the background against which the loss of competitiveness in the 2000s led 
to the huge deficit on current account. 18 
 
Finally, a boost of aggregate demand did take place in the 2000s drawing on 
credit growth, as is discussed in the next section. Note that credit grew while 
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aggregate saving had disappeared; net national saving in Greece has been 
systematically negative since the country’s entry into the Eurozone. 19 By 
implication foreign borrowing has been essential to supporting the country’s 
relatively high rates of growth and investment in the 2000s. Equivalently, when 
foreign borrowing became impossible after the outbreak of crisis in 2010, both 
growth and investment collapsed.  
 
2.3 The aggregate indebtedness of Greece 
 
Aggregate Greek debt – private and public, internal and external – increased 
rapidly in the 2000s. The more the country failed to compete within the 
Eurozone, the more its debt increased, both domestically and abroad. 
Increasing volumes of aggregate debt, needless to say, are not necessarily a 
sign of an economy about to enter crisis: it depends on the uses of the 
accumulated debt. However, in the case of Greece the accumulation of debt 
was a sign of fundamental weakness and loss of competitiveness. 
 
Aggregate debt in Greece increased from roughly 150% to a little less than 
300% of GDP in, respectively, 1997 and 2009; nonetheless, in 2009 it was 
proportionately lower than in Spain and Portugal. 20 The composition of debt for 
2009 showed: public debt at 42%, or 296bn, non-financial corporation debt at 
23%, or 165bn, financial corporation debt at 17%, or 120bn, and household 
debt at 17%, or 123bn. About three quarters of aggregate debt was long-term 
and the rest short-term. Equally important is that externally owed debt came to 
385bn, of which 206bn was owed abroad by the state and 112bn by financial 
corporations.  
 
The trajectory of aggregate Greek debt indicates that there was no credit 
«bubble» in the 2000s. The fastest growing component of aggregate debt in the 
2000s was private debt, in particular debt by financial corporations and 
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households, both of which increased markedly. There was certainly strong 
growth of credit by banks directed toward households and (less) toward non-
financial enterprises. Greek banks borrowed abroad for liquidity, but relied 
heavily on domestic deposits and kept well away from derivatives and other 
forms of financial engineering.   
 
Credit expansion occurred as nominal and real interest rates declined rapidly 
in the periphery after the adoption of the euro. In that environment Greek banks 
were able to fund themselves in the interbank markets to support the domestic 
expansion of credit, though not nearly as heavily as in Spain and Portugal. 21 
This observation alone would suffice to negate the second approach to 
explaining the Greek external deficit, namely the view that stresses the putative 
role of foreign bank lending from core to periphery, mentioned in section 2.2, 
thus assigning the prime explanatory role for the crisis to financial activities. 22  
 
The stress on finance is theoretically problematic since financial flows are 
ultimately secondary to the fundamental productive processes in a capitalist 
economy. 23 Be that as it may, emphasising the role of foreign financial capital 
in the Greek crisis is deeply problematic empirically. For, the expansion of 
demand in Greece in the 2000s relied on growth of credit that was strongly 
driven by domestic banks.  
 
It is a fallacy to conflate the domestic expansion of credit with an inflow of 
loanable capital from abroad which, presumably, led to domestic credit 
expansion, while at the same time increasing external indebtedness. Nominal 
interest rates converged dramatically across the EMU as the ECB coordinated 
the provision of liquidity across the union. However, the divergence in inflation 
rates (and of nominal unit labour costs) meant that real rates of interest were 
higher in the core than the periphery, as is shown in Figure 6. It would have 
been a very strange type of financial capital that actively sought to move from 
a high to a low interest environment.   
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<FIGURE 6 HERE> 
 
There is no doubt that Greece, similarly to other peripheral countries, borrowed 
heavily from abroad during the 2000s. The flows were spurred by Greek 
borrowers, primarily the state and the banks. The macroeconomic functioning 
of the borrowing basically was to finance the huge deficit on current account, 
also reflecting the country’s negative saving. Foreign banks did not lead the 
process of credit growth in Greece; rather, the catalyst was burgeoning 
domestic credit expansion by Greek banks, which took advantage of the 
relatively homogeneous inter-bank market in the Eurozone in the 2000s to 
obtain liquidity cheaply. In a country that had for decades deployed high interest 
rates as an instrument to defend the exchange rate, the low interest rate 
environment offered unprecedented scope for credit expansion to banks, much 
of it directed toward households. Historically and culturally household debt has 
been frowned upon in Greece, but in the late 1990s and the 2000s households 
borrowed heavily to finance house purchases and consumption. The 
accumulation of household debt proved a major problem in the 2010s, once the 
economy had been subjected to bail-out policies.  
 
Public debt rose proportionately less than other parts of aggregate debt in the 
2000s, but from an already high base compared to other peripheral countries. 
Relatively high public debt in Greece has its roots in the 1980s reflecting in part 
the expansion of welfare provision, and in part the sustained weaknesses of the 
tax system. To be specific, welfare provision in Greece has always been 
modest by Western European standards and there has long been systematic 
tax evasion. The economic and political power of large non-financial 
corporations and banks has ensured relative tax immunity for the upper 
echelons of the economy. Significant tax evasion by the upper layers of self-
employed professionals and small and medium enterprises has also been 
widely tolerated. 24 Farmers, meanwhile, have historically been given strong tax 
exemptions ostensibly for reasons of social policy.   
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The crisis faced by the Greek state in the 2010s came less from the increase 
in public debt in the 2000s, as is shown in figure 3, and more from the change 
in the composition of public debt which, following the country’s accession to the 
Eurozone, became heavily skewed toward foreign lenders. In 2009 the Greek 
state owed more than 200bn out of a total of nearly 300bn to foreign lenders, 
among which French and German banks were prominent; much of the 
remaining balance was owed to Greek banks. Interest rates had become 
remarkably low by Greek standards and the country had suddenly acquired a 
putative creditworthiness as a member of the monetary union. European banks 
were prepared to lend to the Greek state allowing it to replenish its stock of debt 
as well as to borrow afresh.  
 
It is notable that these banks failed in the most elementary functions of 
screening and monitoring of borrowers. 25 For, a further remarkable aspect of 
Greek public debt in 2009 was that it was overwhelmingly bond-based, 
denominated in euro and governed by Greek law. 26 The lenders had not done 
their work properly. As the spectre of default arose in 2010 the Greek state held 
a strong bargaining chip in its hands. Unfortunately, it never used it. 
 
3. Responding to the crisis: The iron cage of the euro 
 
There is a tried response to balance of payments crises developed by 
multilateral organisations and forming a part of the so-called “Washington 
Consensus”. 27 Still, the Greek crisis offers some fresh insight because it was 
tried for the first time within a powerful monetary union, such as the EMU. 
 
The first requirement of the response is to deal with the interruption of financial 
flows from abroad. Typically this translates into restoring the interrupted flows 
to the private banks, thus preventing a collapse of credit, as well as restoring 
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the interrupted flows to the state, thus preventing a formal default. The difficulty 
is that there are no formal mechanisms in the world market to restore these 
flows. Thus, the typical practice has been to form ad hoc coalitions of lenders 
from abroad, including private banks, public institutions and, crucially, the IMF 
as coordinator and policy specialist. Funding would typically be provided on the 
basis of “conditionality”, namely a series of policy changes and structural 
reforms to be implemented by the recipient, often designed by the IMF and 
monitored through the gradual release of funds. Conditionality would normally 
revolve around the following two issues.  
 
The first is stabilisation of external and internal imbalances, usually to be 
achieved by reducing domestic demand, i.e., via austerity. Specifically, public 
deficits would be reduced through higher taxes and/or lower expenditure, and 
domestic credit would be constrained through interest rate increases. The 
resulting contraction in aggregate demand would eventually lead to current 
account rebalancing. The cost in terms of unemployment, disrupted welfare 
provision, loss of income, and so on, would depend on the extent of the decline 
of output.   
 
The second is restoring growth, which would typically be achieved by improving 
competitiveness. Thus, wages and salaries would face downward pressure, 
partly through rising unemployment, and partly through labour “reforms” that 
would limit trade union rights, ease dismissals, intensify the precariousness of 
employment, and so on. Deregulation of markets would also be promoted, 
including of financial markets often in the hope of encouraging inward flows of 
foreign capital. Finally, privatisation would be advocated on the grounds that it 
would result in greater efficiency.   
 
The “stabilisation and growth” approach was applied in its essentials to the 
Greek crisis. The results of this approach for output, employment, income and 
the productive structure of crisis-stricken countries have historically been 
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negative. In the case of Greece three features deriving from its membership of 
the Eurozone have made the approach entirely lethal.  
 
The first, and less conspicuous, was the availability of liquidity support for the 
Greek banking system. In a “sudden stop” crisis the domestic banking system 
tends to face liquidity pressure that cannot be easily managed by the central 
bank, particularly if there is a heavy drain on deposits and there are large 
volumes of bank liabilities denominated in a foreign currency. Additional strain 
on the banking system could also emerge from bad debts as the economy 
would begin to contract, thus forcing domestic banks to buttress capital 
adequacy. 
 
For Greek banks the problem of a liquidity was confronted by the ECB and the 
Eurosystem providing facilities through the Long-Term Refinancing Operations, 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance, and the TARGET2 settlement system. The 
dangerous link between a worsening current account and an ensuing lack of 
domestic liquidity was thus broken. 28 At its sharpest in 2010-2, the Greek crisis 
never acquired the acute banking aspect that the huge external deficit of the 
country would have fully justified, other things equal. At the same time, 
however, liquidity provision became the most decisive lever of power for the 
lenders on successive Greek governments. By controlling liquidity the lenders 
allowed the country to remain in the Eurozone, but only on condition of 
submitting to bail-out conditionality. Additional leverage was afforded to the 
lenders by providing funds, borrowed by the Greek state, to strengthen the 
capital adequacy of Greek banks.  
 
The second, and very visible, difference was the absence of an exchange rate 
that could absorb some of the shock of the “sudden stop” through devaluation. 
Stabilisation programmes typically, though not always, involve devaluation of 
the domestic currency which changes the terms of trade and thus rebalances 
the external deficit in the short term. The impact on domestic inflation would 
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depend on the “pass through” from import prices to domestic production. 
Devaluation cannot be a long-term solution to competitiveness problems as its 
impact would eventually pass onto domestic prices, but in the short term it could 
lessen the pressure on the domestic economy, especially if measures were also 
taken to support workers and enterprises. 29 Even in the long run, moreover, 
devaluation could create fresh fields for investment and production by sharply 
changing relative prices. None of these options were available to Greece within 
the Eurozone. 
 
The third difference was the difficulty of lowering the burden of public debt 
through restructuring. Typical methods of reducing the cost of servicing the debt 
include lowering interest rates, and extending the maturity of debt. These 
measures would increase the fiscal space available to the government, thus 
ameliorating austerity. A more decisive method of reducing the burden of debt 
would be to write off some of the principal of the loans, thus also reducing the 
pressure of refinancing the debt. 30  
 
Restructuring inevitably entails losses for the lenders – typically private 
bondholders and banks – thus raising the issue of recompense. Since there are 
no formal international bankruptcy procedures to deal with public debt, its 
restructuring would rely on the balance of sovereign power in the world 
economy. A sovereign state could always default, assuming that the country 
would be prepared to shoulder the cost of legal proceedings and its exclusion 
from the financial markets for a period. Equally, the sovereign states of the 
lenders would seek either to prevent default and restructuring, or at least to limit 
its incidence on their lending institutions and individuals.   
 
In the case of Greece there is undeniable evidence that the IMF was fully aware 
of the importance of devaluation and debt restructuring already in 2010. 31 
However, EMU membership made formal devaluation impossible and debt 
relief was bluntly rejected by Eurozone lenders. Thus, the IMF laid great stress 
19 
 
on “internal devaluation” pivoting essentially on wage reductions. There is no 
evidence that the beneficial impact of devaluation and debt relief could be 
replicated internally, within a reasonable range of values for economic 
magnitudes. By its own admission, the IMF ignored its own research and simply 
kowtowed to political pressure from the lenders to Greece, who were among its 
major shareholders. 32 In 2010, a Greek default, or even major debt 
restructuring, and Greek exit from the EMU would have posed grave risks for 
the banks of the lenders but also for the very survival of the monetary union. 
From the perspective of the lenders, Greece had to be kept in the EMU. It also 
had to bear the brunt of the adjustment without debt restructuring or 
devaluation. The EMU had placed the country in an iron cage and the results 
would soon show.    
 
In 2010 Greece received its first bail-out, the EU and the IMF jointly providing 
funds to replace the interrupted private capital flows and thus allowing the 
Greek state to continue to meet its payment obligations. Needless to say, the 
main obligation of the Greek state was to keep servicing its existing debt, thus 
avoiding default. 33 It was understood that the ECB would continue to provide 
liquidity to keep the Greek banks afloat. The programme was “frontloaded”, 
meaning that the fiscal adjustment would involve cuts in public expenditure for 
the initial period, followed by increases in taxes. A full set of conditionality 
conditions were also specified, along the general lines indicated above. If 
Greece wished to remain in the Eurozone, there would be no devaluation and 
no debt restructuring.  
 
The Greek bail-out agreement of 2010 is arguably one of the worst documents 
on economic policy ever drafted. The bail-out agreement bore no relation to the 
realities of the Greek economy, and nor to the likely impact of the proposed 
policies. For, the magnitude of the putative fiscal adjustment was enormous, 
the external deficit huge, and the competitiveness gap gigantic – and the 
adjustment had to occur within the iron cage of the EMU. IMF economists have 
officially admitted that their estimates of the multipliers of the Greek economy 
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were low, and thus their assessment of contractionary effect of austerity was 
very optimistic. 34 Disaster duly followed.  
 
Aggregate demand contracted violently, and output fell by nearly 7% in both 
2011 and 2012, the total contraction exceeding 25% in 2008-2016. The most 
profound fall has been in investment as enterprises reacted to the decline in 
demand, but also as credit conditions became tighter with banks facing large 
volumes of problematic public debt on their balance sheets. Equally bad for 
enterprises, but much less noticed, has been the effective disappearance of 
commercial credit among enterprises. The collapse in output dramatically 
increased adult unemployment, which exceeded 27% in 2013.  
 
It was apparent already by the middle of 2011 that the first bail-out programme 
had backfired badly. Above all, the recession had worsened the ratio of public 
debt to GDP, shown in figure 3, and Greece continued to face severe difficulties 
in servicing its debt. The country needed a new bail-out and urgent debt 
restructuring. By that time, furthermore, the balance of political forces in Europe 
had been significantly altered since early 2010. For one thing, European banks 
had begun substantially to disengage themselves from Greece already in 2010. 
For another, the EU had begun to establish a panoply of institutions to confront 
sovereign debt problems, including the European Financial Stability Fund, 
which eventually became the European Stability Mechanism, the European 
Financial Stabilization Mechanism, the Securities Market Programme, and 
Outright Monetary Transactions by the ECB. The risks arising from a Greek 
default and exit had been attenuated.  
 
In 2012 Greece received a second bail-out with attached conditionality. During 
2011-12, furthermore, the country received some debt restructuring which was 
remarkable for its one-sided and limited nature. Debt relief offered to Greece 
included extended periods of grace on the bail-out loans, a reduction in average 
interest rates by granting the fresh funds at concessional rates, and a 
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lengthening of the average maturity of debt. 35 There was also debt restructuring 
– the so-called Private Sector Involvement – which effectively wrote off some 
of the principal of Greek debt. In 2012 Greece implemented a bond swap and 
subsequently a debt buy-back that resulted in nominal debt relief of more than 
100bn. 36 
 
Unfortunately for Greece, the bulk of the losses fell on domestic rather than 
foreign lenders, the latter escaping with minimal damage. Greek banks in 
particular were badly affected, and the country was forced to use a large part 
of the bail-out funds for bank recapitalisation. There cannot have been many 
other historical instances of sovereign default which have hurt domestic far 
more than foreign lenders. Moreover, the bail-out funds eventually changed the 
composition of Greek public debt which by 2012 had become mainly bilateral 
or multilateral state debt, governed by international law. 37  Greece had lost its 
main bargaining chip without ever using it. 
 
Finally, in 2015 Greece has needed a third bail-out, following significant political 
upheavals and the imposition of capital controls, which are considered in the 
following section. The underlying cause of the third bail-out was much the 
same: the economy had contracted enormously and public debt was impossible 
to service. The conditionality attached to the third bail-out was of similar nature, 
but by 2015 much of the fiscal and the external adjustment of the country had 
already been accomplished. The pressing problem for Greece had become the 
achievement of sustainable growth and development rather than stabilisation. 
Before considering this issue, however, it is necessary to examine more closely 
the social and political forces that have kept Greece within the Eurozone at 
such tremendous cost to its economy and society.  
 
4. The social and political setting of the Greek crisis 
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The outlook of its lenders toward Greece – represented by the “troika” of the 
EU, the IMF and the ECB – presents few analytical difficulties. The Washington 
Consensus has held powerful ideological sway among the international 
organisations. To make matters worse, European policy makers initially 
perceived the crisis as the result of Greek fiscal mismanagement and “dressing 
up” the official statistics. Only gradually did the realisation emerge that a full-
blown Eurozone crisis was actually unfolding, which required a more coherent 
approach.  
 
The dominant role in devising the new policy approach of the Eurozone was 
played by Germany, a country in which there is an entrenched ideological belief 
that “success” in the 2000s has been due to painful “reforms” in the late 1990s. 
There has been no powerful domestic constituency in Germany pushing for a 
programme to rebalance the entire Eurozone by shifting Germany away from 
its neo-mercantilism. The political message emanating from the country’s 
establishment was – and remains – that Germany is the model for the EMU, 
and therefore austerity is the appropriate policy for the periphery and 
elsewhere. 38  
 
In the realm of material interests, on the other hand, the first priority of the 
“troika” has been to protect the lenders from losses and the Eurozone from the 
threat of a major rupture, as the IMF has openly admitted. 39 If Greece had been 
offered an alternative programme in 2010, there could have been major 
material damage to the Eurozone and its core states. Thus, Greece had to be 
prevented from defaulting and exiting the EMU, while submitting to a 
programme along the lines of the Washington Consensus.  
 
As the crisis unfolded, the attitude of the EU toward Greece has changed 
considerably, not least because of the raft of institutions that have been created 
– above all the European Stability Mechanism – which appear capable of 
dealing with balance of payments crises in the future. At the same time the EU 
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has instituted a permanent regime of fiscal discipline including penalties for 
“delinquent” countries through the Fiscal Compact of 2012. In essence, the 
Stability and Growth Pact that had formally supported the introduction of the 
euro has been re-strengthened in the direction of institutionalised austerity 
under EU surveillance. Steps have also been taken to create a Banking Union, 
above all, by giving the ECB the right to monitor banks and their capital 
adequacy. The Greek crisis has acted as a catalyst for these developments, 
which have strengthened the position of the lenders relative to Greece. Already 
by 2012 the EU could contemplate with considerable equanimity the prospect 
of a Greek default and exit from the EMU.  
 
The position of the IMF toward Greece has also changed significantly in the 
course of the crisis. The Greek programme has rightly been perceived as a 
failure, which has moreover led to substantial exposure by the Fund to Greece. 
The IMF has also clashed with the EU on the question of conditionality which 
the EU bureaucrats have intended to make highly intrusive, attempting to 
reshape Greek society and the Greek state; the IMF, in contrast, has aimed 
primarily at achieving macroeconomic targets. The EU has largely prevailed 
and a welter of “reform” measures have been directed toward the periphery, 
often creating confusion for national authorities. 40  
 
The shifting attitude of the IMF has become apparent in the third Greek bail-out 
in 2015, in which the Fund has not participated officially as a lender. The 
sticking point has been the sustainability of Greek debt in conjunction with the 
policy of austerity. The IMF has advocated writing off some of the principal of 
Greek debt, with a concomitant relaxation of fiscal austerity in the medium term. 
The EU would not easily concur since losses on Greek debt would be borne 
directly by public institutions in Europe, thus creating political and electoral 
repercussions. 
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If the attitude of the lenders in the Greek crisis is relatively complex, the attitude 
of the borrower presents a real conundrum. Why did Greece in 2010 accept a 
programme that was manifestly defective, and why has it persevered with bail-
outs for several years in spite of the damage wrought to economy and society? 
To find an answer it is important to stretch the analysis by focusing on the 
outlook of the Greek “historical bloc”, to use the well-known term by Gramsci 
referring to an alliance of dominant sections of the capitalist class with lower 
classes, which plays a hegemonic role in the economy, politics and culture of a 
country. 41 
 
This is not the place to offer a sociological description of the Greek “historical 
bloc” in the decades following the country’s accession to the EU in 1981. Suffice 
it to state that the dominant bourgeois elements of the bloc have included ship-
owning, banking, construction and manufacturing, which have also had 
widespread ownership and control over the mass media. These elements have 
had considerable influence over the state machine translating into privileged 
access to public procurement and institutionalised tax avoidance. The Greek 
state in the post-war decades has followed its own long historical tradition of 
deploying the forms of a democratic polity, while in practice treating society as 
an occupied foreign territory for the purposes of tax and welfare provision. 42 
The resulting mechanisms of integration and social control have had a strong 
admixture of party politics, a characteristic feature of the Greek social formation. 
The “historical bloc” that has thus emerged has also included layers of the 
professional self-employed, elements of small and medium businesses, and the 
larger agrarian landholders, all of whom have secured variable tax and other 
privileges through a complex electoral machinery connected to the state. 
 
The point to grasp about the Greek “historical bloc” in the face of the crisis of 
2010 was not what it decided to do but rather what it has been absolutely 
determined not to do. And that is to exit the EMU. There can be no doubt on 
this score as it has been restated countless times by government officials and 
others, not to mention being confirmed by the practice of several Greek 
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governments. For the Greek “historical bloc” staying in the EMU became an 
article of faith.   
 
Successive Greek governments have thus accepted confronting the crisis 
without possessing command over monetary and exchange rate policy. By the 
same token, fiscal policy would be rigidly determined by the “troika”, credit 
policy would be increasingly set by the Banking Union, and trade policy would 
be shaped by a series of EU directives. The vicious nature of the Greek crisis 
has resulted largely from the dramatic loss of sovereignty and the lack of 
command over the economic policy instruments. The only option available to 
Greek governments since 2010 has been to attempt to change particular details 
of the bail-out programmes, while complaining about the attitude of the “troika”. 
The exception was the first SYRIZA government, elected in January 2015 on a 
platform of radical policy change. When that government capitulated and signed 
the third bail-out in August 2015, Greece returned to its previous stance. 
 
Why, then, has the Greek “historical” bloc acceded to a programme that has 
profoundly damaged the country? What explains the extraordinary – and 
extraordinarily destructive – determination to remain in the iron cage of the euro 
almost regardless of economic and political cost? 
 
Part of the explanation relates to sectional economic interests within the bloc, 
notably the Greek banks. Without sustained ECB liquidity provision and without 
access to bail-out funds for recapitalisation, Greek banks would have been 
forced to suspend operations as well as facing possible nationalisation. Quite 
naturally banks have been the strongest and most unwavering supporters of 
bail-out programmes in Greece. However, the acquiescence of the Greek 
industrial and manufacturing capital, particularly of the construction sector, is 
harder to explain. As investment collapsed, the productive sector of Greece has 
faced a level of destruction that is of historic dimensions. Accounting for the 
acquiescence of productive capitalists to bail-out policies requires broader 
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arguments regarding the power structures of Greek society as well as the 
political outlook and culture of the Greek people.  
 
One factor has been plain fear. For, default and exit would have led to economic 
and social turmoil in the short-term that would have been likely to generate 
political unrest. In such circumstances there could be no guarantees of which 
political forces would emerge to challenge for power. The risk for the Greek 
“historical bloc” was simply too great. From this perspective it was a rational 
decision to accept the path of the bail-outs and the attendant loss of sovereignty 
rather than risk profound social and political unrest. Moreover, in 2010 it was 
not easy for many to discern the trajectory of destruction that the bail-outs would 
entail. Once the grim reality had begun to emerge in 2011-12, it was still easier 
for the “historical bloc” to continue with the bail-outs in the forlorn hope that 
each step would be the last. Fear of default and exit became an entrenched 
part of Greek public debate, cultivated assiduously by mass media outlets 
typically owned powerful business interests, through outlandish claims of the 
destruction that was likely to follow, including food shortages, lack of medicines, 
and violent unrest in the streets with looting and arson.     
 
The fears of the Greek “historical bloc” were indeed justified. Mass reaction to 
the bail-out measures did occur in 2011-12, subsequently taking overtly political 
forms as the electorate turned to SYRIZA, until then a tiny and untried party of 
the Left. SYRIZA had only very limited connections to the established 
mechanisms of power in Greek politics and the state, and spoke the language 
of wholesale reform and even rebellion in Greece and Europe. The leadership 
of SYRIZA never explicitly promised unilateral default and exit from the 
Eurozone, although it hinted that it would consider both options. Its strategy 
was that it could achieve the lifting of austerity and substantial debt restructuring 
through “tough negotiations” with the European lenders, who would presumably 
relent in the face of the democratic legitimacy of a new SYRIZA government.  
At the same time, the party contained a vocal minority that advocated unilateral 
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default and exit from the EMU. The threat to the Greek “historical bloc” was real 
and present.   
 
SYRIZA won power in January 2015 and the strategy of its leadership was 
tested in protracted negotiations with the lenders. It became rapidly apparent 
that the strategy was completely unrealistic. Debacle followed as the ECB 
limited the provision of liquidity to Greek banks thus causing a gradual 
disruption of economic activity, and eventually forcing the government to 
impose banking and capital controls in July 2015. The SYRIZA leadership had 
not prepared for, and lacked the will to take, the path of default and exit. It 
surrendered in August 2015, signing up the third bail-out and Greek politics 
returned to “normality”.  
 
In explaining the attitude of Greece, however, even more important than fear 
has been the notion of identity attached to the euro. Money is an integral part 
of national and social identity. 43 The euro in Greece has come to symbolise a 
“European” identity that overcomes national divisions and is associated with 
modernity, forward thrust and capturing the future. In a small peripheral country 
that has historically identified “progress” with developments in Western Europe, 
these were very powerful ideological factors. Abandoning the euro and 
reintroducing a national currency would appear as stepping backwards and 
weakening the “European” identity of the Greek people. 44 These arguments, 
relentlessly cultivated by the intellectual elite, acquired extraordinary purchase 
leading to an astonishing uniformity of thought in the public domain. 45 
 
Fear and identity backed by powerful material interests have proven a potent 
mix that has succeeded in keeping Greece within the framework of bail-out 
policies, and thus in the EMU. The Greek “historical bloc” has preferred to 
accept a substantial loss of sovereignty and the destruction of much domestic 
economic activity, rather than adopt the path of default and exit. This 
momentous choice, quite apart from the damage it has entailed for the country 
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hitherto, has also raised the spectre of long-term economic and social decline, 
as is briefly discussed in the following section. 
  
5. Whither Greece? 
 
By 2016, six years after adopting bail-out policies, Greece had achieved a 
degree of stabilisation. The competitiveness gap was partly closed chiefly 
through the collapse of Greek nominal (and real) wages in 2010-2013, as is 
shown in figure 4. However, as is also clear from figure 4, the gap with Germany 
has effectively stopped narrowing since 2014. The competitive weakness of 
Greece in the Eurozone has not been fundamentally eliminated.  
 
The problem that this poses for the country is immediately apparent: 
competitiveness could be further raised through either more wage reductions, 
or through a rapid and sustained rise in productivity. The former runs the risk of 
generating intolerable social and political pressures, given the state of economy 
and society. As for the latter, there is no evidence at all that it could occur within 
the framework of the Washington Consensus stressing deregulation and 
privatisation. In short, without devaluation, Greece is likely to remain in a 
competitiveness mire.  
 
The continuing weakness of the Greek economy is also apparent for several 
more specific reasons:  
i)The deficit on current account has been effectively eliminated, as is 
shown in figure 1, but mostly through a collapse of imports due to the 
contraction of the economy. Greek exports have shown little or no 
dynamism over time.  
ii)The fiscal primary deficit has also been largely eliminated, as is  shown 
in figure 2, through deep reductions in expenditure and substantial 
increases in taxation. However, tax income has consistently failed to 
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meet targets and a huge backlog of unpaid obligations by the public to 
the state has emerged. This is matched by the backlog of delayed 
payments by the state to the public.  
iii)Public debt stands in the vicinity of 180% of GDP, as is shown in figure 
3, and is unsustainable.  
iv)Investment has collapsed, standing at barely above 10% of GDP, and 
matching the negative net saving of the country.  
v)Unemployment rose to above 27% in 2014 and in the following two 
years has declined gently to just over 23%, partly as a result of rapid 
growth in part-time precarious employment, and partly due to large scale 
emigration by trained youth. Greece faces substantial long-term 
unemployment.  
v)The Greek banking system has become heavily concentrated in the 
course of the bail-outs, and four “systemic” bank have come to control 
the bulk of deposits and loans. Banks have suffered a sustained loss of 
deposits, on which they have historically relied for liquidity. Banks also 
face a tremendous accumulation of non-performing exposure, and 
although they appear to be well capitalised a large proportion of their 
capital comprises deferred tax liabilities. The imposition of capital 
controls in 2015 has prevented a banking collapse, but at the same time 
it has meant that deposits are unlikely to return en masse to Greek banks 
in the foreseeable future. Moreover, in November 2015 the four 
“systemic” Greek banks engaged in large scale equity issue to buttress 
their capital adequacy in line with EU directives on the Banking Union. 
As a result public ownership of banks has been dramatically reduced, 
the public sums previously given to banks for recapitalisation have 
effectively evaporated, and international hedge funds have acquired 
significant equity stakes in Greek banks. Under these conditions it is 
highly unlikely that there would be a strong revival of bank credit in the 
foreseeable future.  
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In the late 2010s Greece has found itself in a position similar to that of Germany 
immediately after the First World War. As Keynes famously argued, the victors’ 
peace at Versailles had forced Germany to pay huge reparations, while 
simultaneously precluding it from securing the external surplus that would allow 
it to make the payments. 46 In the 2010s Greece – and much of the Eurozone 
periphery – is weighed down by enormous debt and is saddled with policies 
that are unlikely to support growth. German neo-mercantilism has made it 
unlikely that Greece would be able to generate the external surpluses 
necessary to service its debt. 
 
The social implications of the bail-outs, meanwhile, have been exceptionally 
severe.  Greece has suffered from a rapid increase of poverty; there has been 
a decline in primary health care; primary and secondary education have faced 
cuts in resources; homelessness and shared housing have escalated. The 
contraction of output has also led to a collapse of real estate prices, while at the 
same time taxation on real estate has increased substantially. The result has 
to been a trap for real estate owners: able to sell only at substantial loss, they 
face significant increases in real estate taxes and declining income.  
 
Even worse, there is no reason to assume that the administrative capabilities 
of the Greek state have substantially improved as a result of the bail-outs. 
Indeed they might have even declined in some areas as there has been loss of 
employment, real wages have declined, and morale is low in the public sector. 
To make matters worse, the power of the lenders is manifested through the 
presence of the “troika” in several key locations within the state. Not a single 
economic or social decision can be made by the Greek state without the 
agreement of the “troika” that it complies with fiscal targets. 
 
In sum, the future of Greece in the Eurozone looks bleak. The country will 
probably face low and unstable growth in the coming years, with large 
unemployment, persistent poverty and social dislocation. The political 
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counterpart to economic weakness will be a state incapable of exercising 
sovereignty over key areas of policy, and subservient to the demands of the 
lenders.  
 
To avoid this path Greece should consider precisely the policy options that its 
“historical block” has consistently evaded, i.e., default and exit from the 
Eurozone. Needless to say, the country would also need a plan for national 
revival focusing on saving, investment and targeted industrial policies. The 
immediate prerequisite for such a change on strategy would be a restoration of 
sovereignty. It remains to be seen whether the Greek people have the strength 
to create a new “historical bloc” that could revamp the prospects of their 
country.   
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Figure 1  Current Account Balance as % of GDP   
 
 
Source: Constructed from AMECO data. 
 
Figure 2  Primary Balance as % of GDP   
 
 
Source: Constructed from AMECO data. 
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Figure 3  Gross Public Debt as % of GDP   
 
 
Source: Constructed from AMECO data. 
 
Figure 4  Nominal Unit Labour Costs   
 
 
Source: Constructed from AMECO data. 
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Figure 5  Labour productivity growth   
 
 
Source: Constructed from AMECO data. 
 
FIG. 6  Real interest rates in the Eurozone 
 
Source: Constructed from AMECO data. 
 
 
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
Y
o
Y
 G
ro
w
th
France Germany Greece Italy Spain
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
France Germany Greece Italy Spain
40 
 
ENDNOTES 
1 The literature on sudden reversals in foreign lending is extensive. Calvo et.al. (2006) provide 
a taxonomy of such crises, mostly in developing countries; see also Calvo (2007). For the EMU, 
Merler and Pisany-Ferry (2012) have stressed the importance of interrupted cross-border 
capital flows; see also Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015).   
2 See Pisany-Ferry (2011). 
3Noted with some despair by De Grauwe (2011).   
4An early analysis of the Eurozone crisis as a balance of payments, or “sudden stop” crisis, 
even though the term was not actually deployed, was by Lapavitsas et.al. (2010a), which has 
subsequently appeared in Lapavitsas et.al. (2012). Note that recognition of the specific form of 
“sudden stop” crises is not at all the same as accepting a neoclassical analysis of such crises. 
The dumb fact of capitalist turmoil is (usually) evident to all economists; the analytics deployed 
to account for it are quite another matter. The present article relies heavily, if implicitly, on the 
theoretical armoury of Classical and Marxist political economy.   
5 See, for instance, Sinn (2014). 
6 See Lapavitsas et.al. (2010a) and Flassbeck and Lapavitsas (2013, 2015); see also Bibow 
(2012).  
7 Note that there are also mainstream expositions of the approach to competitiveness that 
stresses the problematic nature of German wage policies; see Bofinger (2015) and Wren-Lewis 
(2015). 
8 See, for instance, Lane (2012). 
9 See Nikiforos, Papadimitriou and Zezza (2016). 
10 See Flassbeck and Lapavitsas (2015). Perhaps the most sustained examination of the 
transformation of the EU in view of developments in Germany has been undertaken at the Max 
Planck Institute in Cologne. See in particular Streeck (2016) whose work on the disintegrating 
effect of neoliberalism in the EU and the reassertion of the nation state has had the widest 
impact. See also Scharpf (2010, 2016) who has also analysed the rise of neoliberalism in the 
EU, and more recently examined the rise of German domination and the resulting stratification 
of the EU. Further incisive political economy analysis of the EU and the euro along similar lines 
has been undertaken by Hoepner (2014).   
11 In political economy terms, the “law of value” does not hold in the world market, as has been 
known since the days of Ricardo (1817).  
12 There is a sizeable literature that engages in precisely such exercises. Thus, Felipe and 
Kumar (2011), keen to argue that wage reductions would not improve competitiveness, 
conflated national and enterprise competitiveness. Gabrisch and Staehr (2014), wishing to 
claim that causality runs from capital flows to unit labour costs – a direction of causation for 
which there is no coherent argument – ran a series of Granger causality tests the meaning of 
which is entirely unclear. Storm and Naastepad (2015), on the other hand, in an effort to reject 
the nominal unit labour cost argument invented an entirely fictitious German productivity 
miracle. It is interesting to note in this connection that Wyplosz (2013), after doing his best to 
measure away the divergence of nominal unit labour costs in the Eurozone, concluded that the 
true cause of the crisis has been booming domestic demand that was either due to credit, or to 
fiscal deficits.   
13 See Lapavitsas et.al. (2010a). 
14 See Lapavitsas et.al. (2010a).  
15 See Gourinchas, Philippon and Vayanos (2016). 
16 See Lapavitsas et.al. (2010a). 
17 See Vavouras (2013). 
18 Aliber (2010) was one of the first to stress the importance of the structural shift in the Greek 
economy together with the deleterious impact of capital flows and the euro. 
19 See Mariolis (2016); see also Lapavitsas et. al., (2010b), which has subsequently appeared 
in Lapavitsas et.al. (2012). Greek saving is further analysed by Katsimi and Moutos (2010). 
20 All figures on Greek debt come from Lapavitsas et. al., (2010b), one of the earliest 
decompositions of Greek debt following the outbreak of the crisis. 
21 On this point see also Gourinchas, Philippon and Vayanos (2016). 
22 This view has been prominent among heterodox economists, drawing on post-Keynesian 
analysis of “finance-led” capitalism, but has also found resonance among mainstream 
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economists, for instance, Wyplosz (2013). A variant of it has been strongly put across by Storm 
and Naastepad (2015). 
23 The explosive growth of financial markets and the expansion of international financial flows 
do not negate this analytical principle of political economy, but simply give it more complex 
forms, some of which are concretely discussed in this article in relation to the Eurozone. In 
contemporary financialised capitalism the penetration of finance in the activities of productive 
capital add still further complexity, see Lapavitsas (2013).  
24 See Artavanis, Morse and Tsoutsoura (2012), who estimate that only in 2009 there were at 
least 28bn of unreported income by self-employed professionals, a tremendous sum by Greek 
standards. 
25 For an acknowledgement of this point from the mainstream see Buti and Carnot (2012) and 
Obstfeld (2013). 
26 As was pointed out by Buchheit and Gulati (2010) in one of the earliest and most penetrating 
analyses of Greek public debt. 
27 Various aspects of which are discussed in Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus (2001).  
28 See also Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, and Wolff (2013). 
29 For the likely implications of devaluation for the Greek economy, see Katsinos and Mariolis 
(2012), one of the few careful empirical studies of the issue. 
30 For the likely impact on fiscal space of various measures to restructure Greek public debt, 
see Lapavitsas and Munevar (2014). 
31 See IMF (2016). 
32 See IMF (2016, p. 28). 
33 It has been estimated that out of the funds provided to Greece by the first and the second 
bail-outs, which have together exceeded 215bn, only 9.7bn, or 4.5%, have actually gone to 
financing primary deficits; the rest have covered the needs of servicing the public debt, i.e., 
protecting the interests of foreign lenders in the first instance; see Rocholl and Stahmer (2016). 
34 See Blanchard and Leigh (2013). 
35 See Greek Public Debt Management Agency, available at http://www.pdma.gr/index.php/en/ 
36 See Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati (2013). 
37 Wyplosz and Sgherri (2016, p. 41) call it “the most dramatic credit migration from private into 
official hands in the history of sovereign debt”. It was not a “migration” that benefitted the Greek 
people. 
38 See Flassbeck and Lapavitsas (2013 and 2015). 
39 This is one of the most striking aspects of the Fund’s internal review; see IMF (2016). 
40 See IMF (2016, p.31). 
41 For a penetrating discussion of Gramsci’s concept and its usefulness in analysing the 
Eurozone crisis, see Sotiris (2013). 
42 The predatory attitude of the Greek state toward society and its importance in sustaining the 
power of the “historical bloc” since independence in 1830 has been discussed by Kostis (2015), 
though certainly not in the same terms, or from the same standpoint, as in this article.   
43 For further discussion of the broader social role of money, see Lapavitsas (2013). 
44 Greece has been very similar to Italy in this respect. The ideological role of the euro in Italy, 
particularly its association with progress, modernity, efficiency and overcoming various putative 
national weaknesses has been extensively documented by Giurlando (2016).   
45 Exceptions, especially among economists, were remarkably few. Prominent among these 
were Mariolis (2016) – as well as in several other publications – and Skaperdas (2011).   
46 See Keynes (1929). 
